Aitareya Upanishad | Shankara | II i INTRO
PART II
CНАРТЕR I
Introduction:
The purport of the Fourth (i.e. First) Part (just finished) is this:
The Reality, that is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the universe, and is transcendental, omniscient, omnipotent, and all-knowing,
created in due order, this entire universe beginning with space, without the help of any substance other than Himself.
Then He entered by Himself into all living creatures for the sake of self-realisation.
And having entered there, He realised directly His own Self in its reality as “I am this Brahman.” Therefore He is the only one Self in all bodies and there is none besides.
And so everybody else, too, should realise thus:
“He is my Self'” (Kau. III. I. 8), “I am Brahman" (Bṛ. I. iv. 10).
Moreover, It has been said here, “in the beginning this was but the absolute Self alone" (Ai. I. i. 1), and “Brahman that is the most pervasive" (Ai. I. iii. 13), and so also in other Upaniṣads.
Objection:
For the One that is all-pervasive and that is the Self of all, there is not so much as the point of a hair unoccupied.
Therefore how could He enter by splitting the end like an ant entering into a hole?
Answer:
This is but an insignificant question to be posed when there are so many others that can be asked here.
That without organs He thinks; that without the help of anything He created this universe; that gathering up (a lump of) the human size from water, He gave it shape;
that from His brooding parted the mouth etc., from which emerged Fire etc., the presiding deities of the organs; that the deities became associated with hunger and thirst;
that they prayed for abodes; that cows etc. were shown to them; that they entered into their respective abodes; that the created food ran away; that there was an attempt at taking it up with the organ of speech etc.—
- all these are on a par with the (problem of) splitting the end and entering.
Objection: Then reject all this as incoherent.
Answer:
No, there is no fault, since all this is but eulogistic, the only thing sought to be taught being the knowledge of the Self.
Or a better explanation is that the Deity, who is omniscient and omnipotent and is a great conjurer, created all this like a magician;
but the parable etc. are elaborated here for the sake of easy instruction and comprehension just as it is done in ordinary life.
For the mere acquaintance with stories regarding creation etc. leads to no useful result, whereas it is well known in all the Upaniṣads that from the knowledge of the unity of the Self follows immortality as a result;
and the same fact is in evidence in the Smṛti like the Gītā in such sentences as “(He sees, who sees) the Lord Supreme, existing in all beings, (deathless in the dying)" (XIII. 27). .
Objection:
There are 3 souls:
One is well known in the world and in all the scriptures
as the transmigrating soul that enjoys and acts.
The second soul is God, the creator of the universe, the Intelligent One:
And He is inferable from the logical ground shown in the scriptures,
viz. the creation of bodies and worlds fitted with many localities that are suitable for the enjoyment of the fruits of actions of innumerable beings,
just as an architect etc. possessed of the requisite skill and knowledge can be inferred from the fact of the construction of a town, a palace, etc.
The third is the all-pervading Consciousness (Puruṣa) presented by the Upaniṣads alone and well known from such texts as:
“From where speech turns back" (Tai. II. iv. 1), ‘‘Not this, not this" (Bṛ. III. ix. 26).
Thus there are 3 selves distinct from one another. That being so, how can it be known that the Self is one without a second and transcendental?
Vedāntist: As to that, how is the individual soul even known?
Opponent:
Is he not known as the hearer, thinker, seer, teacher, maker of (inarticulate) sound, perceiver, and knower?
Vedāntist:
Is it not contradictory to say of him, who is known through the act of hearing etc., that
“He thinks without being thought of,
he knows without being known” (Bṛ. III. viii. 11, Ke. I. i. 6), and that
“You cannot think that which is the thinker of thought;
you cannot know that which is the knower of knowledge" (Bṛ. III. iv. 2) etc.?
Opponent:
True, it will involve a contradiction if the individual soul is known directly like happiness etc.
But as a fact, direct perception is denied by “You cannot think that which is the thinker of thought” etc.
But he is known through such inferential ground as hearing. Hence how can there be a contradiction?
Vedāntist:
How is he known even through such ground of inference as hearing?
For when the Self is engaged in hearing an audible sound, it cannot have the actions of thinking and knowing with regard to itself or anything else, since it is engrossed in the mere act of hearing.
So also with regard to other acts like thinking.
And the acts of hearing etc. pertain to their own objects only (and not to their subjects); not that the act of thinking by the thinker can occur with regard to anything outside the thinkable.
Opponent: Is not the mind able to think of everything?
Vedāntist: Truly this is so; still no thinkable can be thought of without the thinker.
Opponent: Granted this is so, what follows?
Answer:
This will be accruing result here. He who is the thinker of all will simply be the thinker, and he will not be an object of thought. And there is not a second thinker who can think of that thinker.
Should he be thinkable by the Self, then there will be 2 Selves—the one being the Self by which the (thinking) Self is thought of and the other Self which is thought of.
Or the same Self will be split into two halves, like a bamboo, to become the thinker and the thinkable. But it is illogical either way.
This is analogous to the case of two lamps which, because of their similarity, cannot be (mutually) the illuminator and the illumined.
Besides, the thinker, while engaged in thinking the thinkable object, has no time left out from the process of thinking during which to think of himself.
Even on the supposition that the thinker thinks of the Self through the grounds of inference, there will spring up 2 Selves—the one that is inferred through logical grounds, and the other that infers.
Or the same Self will be split up. And so there will be the defect already mentioned.
Objection:
If the Self be not known cither through perception or inference, why is it said, “One should realise thus: “He is my Self?” (Kau. III. 9)? Or why is the Self called the thinker and the hearer?
Answer:
Is it not a fact that the Self is possessed of such qualities as the capacity of hearing;- and is it not well known (in the Upaniṣads) that It is free from such qualities as the capacity of hearing?
What inconsistency do you find here?
Opponent: Though it may not strike you as incongruous, to me it is so.
Vedāntist: How?
Opponent:
When the Self is a hearer, It is not a thinker: and when It is a thinker, It is not a hearer.
That being so, It becomes a hearer and a thinker from one point of view, while from another It is neither a hearer nor a thinker. So with regard to other situations.
That being so, how can you avoid the feeling of an irreconcilability in the face of the doubt that crops up as to whether the Self possessed of the capacity to hear etc. or possessed of the opposite quality of not being able to hear etc.?
At the time when Devadatta moves he is not stationary, but is moving to be sure; and when he is motionless, he is not moving, but staying on.
During such a period he can be cither moving or staying as an only exclusive alternative; but he cannot be both moving and staying continuously.
The same is the case here.
Similar (also) is the view, in this matter, of the followers of Kaṇāda and others, according to whom the Self is called a hearer, a thinker, and so on because of Its being occasionally possessed of hearing etc.
For they say that the knowledge is a product of contact (between the mind and the senses), and that this contact is not simultaneous.
And (as a proof) they adduce such an argument as:
“My mind was occupied with some other object, so I did not see this."
And (they argue that) it is proper to accept the non-simultaneity of knowledge as a logical ground for inferring the existence of mind.
Let this be so. What do you lose if it be so?
Vedāntist:
Let it be so if it be logical and if it pleases you.
But it cannot be the meaning of the Upaniṣads.
Opponent: is it not implied by the Upaniṣads that the Self is the hearer, thinker, etc.?
Vedāntist: No, since there is the statement that It is not the hearer, thinker, etc.
Opponent: Was not that position denied by you by saying that It is occasionally so?
Vedāntist:
No, for by me the Self is accepted as the eternal hearer etc., according to the Vedic text,
“For the listener’s function of hearing can never be lost," etc. (Br. IV. iii. 27).
Objection:
If on that view eternal hearing is admitted, there will be the simultaneous origin of (all kinds of) knowledge that will contradict experience;
besides, this will lead to the assumption of absence of ignorance in the Self. And that is unacceptable.
Answer:
Neither of the defects arises, since according to the Upaniṣads, the Self can become the hearer etc. through Its (inherent) power of hearing etc. (Br. III. iv. 2).
The seeing etc., by the impermanent and gross eyes etc. that are subject to conjunction and disjunction (with their objects), are impermanent indeed, just as is the burning of fire because of its production from contact with hay etc.
Not that the eternal and formless Self, which is free from the attributes of conjunction and disjunction, can have transitory qualities like seeing etc. that are caused by contact.
In support of this is the Vedic text:
“The vision of the witness can never be lost,” etc. (Bṛ. IV. iii. 23).
From this it follows that there are 2 kinds of vision—the transitory vision of the eye and the eternal vision of the Self.
Similarly, there are 2 kinds of hearing—the transitory hearing of the ear and the eternal hearing of the Self.
So also are there 2 kinds of thinking and 2 sorts of knowing—the external and the internal.
For on this view alone, and in the way it has been shown, does the Vedic text
“The seer of seeing and the hearer of hearing,” (Bṛ. III. iv. 2) become justifiable.
It is a matter of experience, too, that the vision of the eye is non-eternal inasmuch as it is lost or regained in accordance as the disease, called Timira, sets in or is cured.
Similar is the case with hearing and thinking.
And the eternality of the vision of the Self is well known in the world, for a man whose eyes have been plucked out says, “My brother has been seen by me, in dream today.”
Similarly, a man who is known to be deaf may say,
“A mantra has been heard by me today in dream”, etc.
Should the eternal vision of the Self be produced merely through the contact of the eye, it should be destroyed on the destruction of the later:
and then a man whose eyes are plucked out should not perceive blue, yellow, etc. in dream.
Moreover, such Vedic texts as,
“The vision of the witness can never be lost” etc. (Bṛ. IV. iii. 23), would be illogical;
and the same will be the fate of such Vedic texts as,
“That is the eye in a man through which one sees in a dream.”
The logical position is this:
The eternal vision of the Self witnesses the ephemeral external vision; but since the external vision has such changing attributes as growth and decay, the vision of the Self that witnesses it, appears accordingly and seems to be ephemeral owing to the error of men.
The ease is similar to that of the vision fixed in a whirling firebrand or such other things, where the vision seems to be revolving (as the latter does).
And in confirmation of this is the Vedic text,
“It thinks as it were, and shakes as it were” (Bṛ. IV. iii. 7).
Hence the vision of the Self being eternal, it can have neither simultaneity, nor the opposite of it.
But for the ordinary people, owing to their preoccupation with the external limiting adjuncts, and for the logicians, owing to their remaining outside scriptural tradition, it is quite possible to have the erroneous idea that the vision of the Self is impermanent.
The imagination of difference among God, the individual soul, and the supreme Self can also be traced to this error; and equally erroneous it is to fancy such ideas as “it is”, “it is not” with regard to the eternal and unconditioned vision of that Entity in which all the variations of speech and mind (i.e. name and form) get unified.
He who entertains, with regard to that Reality beyond all speech and mind, any idea of fancying that It exists, or It does not exist; that It is one, or that It is many;
that It has attributes, or that It has not; that It knows, or that It does not; that It is active, or that It is not; that It is fruitful, or that It is fruitless; that It has a seed, or that It is seedless;
that It is happiness, or that It is misery; that It is inside, or that It is outside; that It is void, or that It is not; or that It is different from me, or that It is I;—
- (that man) may as well wish to roll up the sky like leather, to ascend there with his feet, or to trace the footprints of the fish and birds in water and sky;
for the Vedic texts declare:
“Not this, not this” (Bṛ. III. ix. 26), “From which words turn back” (Tai. II. iv. l), and so on.
And there is the mantra text, “Who indeed knows?” etc. (R.I.XXX.6).
Objection:
How does he, then, get the realisation, “He is my Self”?
Tell me, how can I realise Him as, “He is my Self.”
Answer:
Apropos of this, they relate a story:
An idiot, who committed some guilt was told, “Fie on you! You are no man!”
Because of his stupidity he approached somebody to get the conviction that he was a man and told him, “Tell me who I am.”
The latter understood his silliness and said, “I shall make you understand by degrees.”
And then after proving that he was not a motionless thing, and so on, he (the teacher) concluded with, “You are none other than a man.”
That dullard then told him,
“You who started to enlighten me have become silent.
Why do you not instruct me?”
That sentence of yours is just like this:
How can he, who does not understand himself to be a man when told, “You are none other than a man,” understand himself to be a man even when told, “You are a man”?
Therefore the process to be followed in enlightening about the Self is as it is set forth in the scriptures and nothing else; for hay etc. that can be consumed by fire are not burnt by anything else.
It is because of this that the scripture, which started to impart knowledge about the nature of the Self, stopped after declaring “Not this, not this” (Bṛ. III. ix. 26), just as it was done in the story after denying all that was other than man.
And similar are the texts,
“Without interior or exterior” (Br. II. v. 19, III. viii. 8),
“This Self, the perceiver of everything, is Brahman. This is the teaching” (Br. II. v. 19),
“Thou art That” (Ch. VI. viii-xvi),
“But when to the knower of Brahman, everything has become the Self,
what should one see and through what?” (Br. II. iv, 14, IV. v. 15);
- and there are still others.
As long as one does not realise thus this Self that has been described, so long does one accept the limiting adjunct, possessed of the external and impermanent vision, as one's Self;
and considering through ignorance the attributes of the limiting adjuncts as one's own, one transmigrates under the influence of ignorance, desire, and action,
by rotating again and again through the regions of the gods, animals, and men, that range from Brahma to a clump of grass.
While transmigrating thus, one rejects the body assumed earlier, and giving it up, accepts another.
In the course of showing what states one experiences as one continues thus without a break in the current of birth and death, as though in a river,
the Upaniṣad says with a view to generating detachment: